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1. INTRODUCTION
Sponsored search advertising(SSA), where advertisers pay to appear alongside the algo-
rithmic/organic search results, is a signiﬁcant growth market and is largely responsible for
the success of Internet Search giants such as Google and Yahoo!. The statistics show that
the growth of the overall online advertising market has been around 30% every year, as
compared to the 1-2% of the traditional media, and is expected to increase to $35.4 billion
in 2012 from around $20 billion in 2007.
In this form of advertising, the Search Engine allocates the advertising space using an
auction. Advertisers bid upon speciﬁc keywords (i.e. query words). When a user searches
for a keyword, the search engine (i.e. the auctioneer) allocates the advertising space to
the bidding merchants based on their bid values and quality scores, and their ads are listed
accordingly. Usually, the sponsored search results appear in a separate section of the page
designated as “sponsored links” above/below or to the right of the organic/algorithmic re-
sults and have similar display format as the algorithmic results. Each position in such a
list of sponsored links is called a slot. Whenever a user clicks on an ad, the correspond-
ing advertiser pays an amount speciﬁed by the auctioneer; hence, the term Cost Per Click
(CPC). Generally, users are more likely to click on a higher ranked slot, and therefore,
advertisers prefer to be in higher ranked slots and compete for them. The auction currently
used by Google and Yahoo! is a generalization of the Vickrey auction [Vickrey 1961], and
is referred to as the GSP (Generalized Second Price) mechanism. GSP is tailored to the
unique requirements of SSA, and has quite different incentive properties than the original
Vickrey auction, and has been extensively studied in recent years [Edelman et al. 2007;
Varian 2007; Lahaie 2006; Aggarwal et al. 2006; Lahaie and Pennock 2007].
The analysis of the underlying SSA models has so far primarily focused on the scenario
where advertisers/bidders interact directly with a primary auctioneer or AdNetwork, e.g.,
they bid for ad-space at leading search engine and publisher portals. The market, however,
has evolved rapidly, and is already witnessing the spontaneous emergence of several cate-
gories of companies who are trying to mediate or facilitate the auction process. The main
focus of such entities is to generate relevant leads or trafﬁc for the advertisers. For ex-
ample, a whole genre of companies, collectively referred to as the online lead generation
market, specialize in aggregating trafﬁc to their sites by bidding for keywords on major
portals and search engines. Then, instead of selling services and products themselves, they
have advertisers signed up on their sites to capture the funneled trafﬁc. The exact pricing
model for the leads sold at these sites varies a great deal, including cost-per-thousand im-
pressions(CPM), CPC andCost per Action(CPA), where“action”couldimplycompletion
of a certain transaction by the lead at the advertiser’s site. Examples of such companies in-
clude, Oversee.net, LeadClick Media, ad pepper, ValueClick etc. and, according to IDC1,
the lead-generationmarketis the fastest growingsegmentof onlineadvertisingand in 2007
raked in more than $1.5 billion in revenues.
There are several unexplored fundamental issues that come up when one considers the
combined system comprising both the primary auctioneers and the mediators. For exam-
ple, in the above mentioned lead-generation scenario, advertisers have the choice to either
1http://www.gpbullhound.com/research.php, http://tmginteractive.com/Sector%20Report%20Online%20Lead
%20Generation%20March%202007.pdf
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directly place their ads on the search portals (i.e., the primary auctioneers), or buy leads
from the mediators, or pursue both avenues. Then, are there inherent unmet demands or
inefﬁciencies in the SSA model that enable mediators to ﬁll an economic need and survive,
or would in the long term the primary auctioneers simply change mechanisms or improve
efﬁciency and take over the services provided by the mediators? How are the revenues of
the primary auctioneers effected by the presence of the mediators? What are some of the
mechanisms that the middlemen can use so as to carve out an efﬁcient niche? In other
words, we ask whether the primary auctioneers and the for-proﬁt mediators can coexist
in an economic and game theoretic sense, and if they do coexist, then what ramiﬁcations
would it have on the overall efﬁciency and the utility of the advertisers.
In the present work, we adopt a fundamental approach, where we ﬁrst identify an in-
herent feature of the sponsored search advertising market, namely capacity constraints,
which could be key to the emergence of new market entities. This natural constraint in
the SSA framework arises from the fact that there is a limit on the number of available
advertisement slots (or slots that receive any clicks from users), especially for the popular
keywords, and as a result, a signiﬁcant pool of advertisers are left out. Consequently, new
market mechanisms, as well as, new for-proﬁt agents are likely to emerge to combat or to
make proﬁt from the opportunities created by scarcity in ad-space inventory. We show that
this unmet need, i.e., the need of a large pool of advertisers to get leads, triggers a 3-fold
diversiﬁcation in the terms of
—the emergence of new market mechanisms
—the emergence of new for-proﬁt agents, and
—the participation of a wider pool of bidders/advertisers.
First, we propose a model where the additional capacity is provided by for-proﬁt agents
(or, mediators), who compete for slots in the original auction, draw trafﬁc, and run their
own sub-auctions. We show that the revenue of the auctioneer, as well as the social value
(i.e. efﬁciency), always increase when mediators are involved. Next, we ask the question-
what if the auctioneer wants to provide the additional capacity herself by essentially act-
ing herself as a mediator and running a single combined auction? Do the revenue of the
auctioneer and overall efﬁciency improve or do they degrade in such a model? We show
that, unlike the mediator-based model, there is often a tradeoff between the revenue and
the capacity, and there is a phase transition from possibly a gain in terms of revenue to a
loss as the ﬁtness (a measure of the quality of the additional capacity) increases, meaning
that there is a critical ﬁtness value beyond which the auctioneer always loses in revenue.
However, there exist scenarios where the revenue of the auctioneer could indeed increase
by increasing capacity. In the case of efﬁciency, the result is more in consonance with the
mediator-based model, i.e., the efﬁciency increases as ﬁtness increases. However, unlike
the mediator-based model, the efﬁciency could indeed decrease by increasing capacity.
Our results and analysis indicate that for-proﬁt mediators that can increase capacity and
ad inventory space can indeed coexist along with primary auctioneers. In fact, they add
signiﬁcantly to the overall efﬁciency and the utility of the advertisers. Thus, the SSA mar-
ket becomes more capacity efﬁcient by the involvement of such mediators, and we should
expect such entities to proliferate and continue to thrive. The market, however, has had
concerns about certain other kinds of mediators, particularlythose that abuse inefﬁciencies
present in the market, and both Google and Yahoo! have taken measures to actively dis-
courage and eliminate such entities. As discussed in the following, the mediators that we
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have analyzed are very different in nature and can survive only if they enhance both user
experience, and quality of trafﬁc for the advertisers.
(1) Our model is motivated by a few examples from Google Adwords, provided in the
APPENDIX. For example, the mediator “business.com” bids for the keyword “888
number” and then sells the leads at its own site via a second auction. Similarly, the
mediator“personalloans.com”doesthe same for the keyword“easy loans”. Of course,
the real world mediators use mechanisms other than secondary auctions to sell the
leads that they aggregate. The analysis of such combined systems (i.e., keyword auc-
tions at the primary site and different pricing mechanisms at the mediators’ sites) can
also be carried out in a manner similar to the approach adopted in this paper.
(2) The success of a mediator depends on how well she creates the additional capacity,
and how efﬁciently she sells them. The ﬁrst aspect is captured by a ﬁtness factor in
our model, which is essentially a measure of the quality of the additional capacity
provided by the mediator. The second aspect is captured by the value she derives by
selling the additional capacity. Both these quantities are formally deﬁned later in the
paper. Intuitively, it is important that the ﬁtness of the mediator be very good so that
she can ensure a better value (i.e. revenue from selling additional capacity) and be
competent in bidding for and obtaining a slot in the primary auction (i.e. at the search
portal). Consequently, a mediator with poor ﬁtness will not be able to survive in the
market. Thus, the kind of mediators we study in this paper are speciﬁcally the ones
who can efﬁciently create extra capacity (i.e., increase ad inventory) while enhancing
user experience.
(3) In general, there could be several other inefﬁciencies in the SSA framework, and the
market may naturally see the emergence of different kinds of for-proﬁt agents as a
result of these inefﬁciencies. For example, the tail queries or infrequentkeywords, can
easily comprise 40% or more of the total query volume at any search portal. Individu-
ally, each such keyword is difﬁcult to identify, and even if identiﬁed, it does not have
high enough volume to be attractive enough for advertisers to place bids on. Conse-
quently, a signiﬁcant fraction of queries are never matched to any advertisement, even
though the users may have speciﬁc and well-deﬁned commercial intent behind such
queries. The existence of such high-volumebut poorly monetized query trafﬁc has led
to the emergenceof a separate class of mediators,collectivelyreferredto as the search
engine or click arbitrage sector. In an ideal world, such mediators could enhance user
experience by better capturing user intention, i.e., by buying a large number of infre-
quent keywords with similar intent or from a particular vertical sector (e.g., health,
ﬁnance, or travel), and then funneling the trafﬁc to a site that shows relevant ads (i.e.,
on topics related to the users’ original queries), but based on high-priced keywords.
Since the infrequent keywords are cheaper to buy, the mediators can turn a proﬁt by
showing ads for keywords that are more popular, and hence more expensive.
In reality, however, capturing user intention in a large-scale fashion is a very difﬁcult
problem, and many such click arbitrageurs end up buying infrequent keywords at a
cheap price and selling them at a higher price by taking the users to pages full of ads
that are not necessarily related to the original keywords (and may be put by a different
auctioneer), without regard to and often compromising user experience. Most of the
time, users just click on these pricey but irrelevant ads to make their way out of those
pages. Given that the pricing mechanism is PPC (pay-per-click)based, the advertisers
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do pay for all such junk clicks, makingfortunes for these arbitrageurs. In the long run,
however, such an abuse of the inefﬁciency (i.e., the inability of the primary auctioneer
to capture commercial user intention for a large enough fraction of query volume) is
automatically eliminated as advertisers ﬁgure out the diminishing conversion rates,
thereby decreasing their bids and paying much less or nothing for these junk clicks.
Also, the auctioneers may take smart actions to ban such arbitrageurs (since the trafﬁc
from these arbitrage companies are of poor quality or being funneledto a competitor),
and the company Geosign being banned by Google is a prime example of this2. It is
important to reiterate that the mediators we discuss in this paper, however, do not fall
in this category of short term proﬁteers.
Now we discuss the formal setup for the standard sponsored search auctions which will
be helpful in the presentation of our model for creating additional capacity. Formally, in
the current models, there are K slots to be allocated among N (≥ K) bidders (i.e. the
advertisers). A bidder i has a true valuation vi (known only to the bidder i) for the speciﬁc
keyword and she bids bi. The expected click through rate (CTR) of an ad put by bidder i
when allocated slot j has the form CTRi,j = γjei i.e. separable in to a position effect and
an advertiser effect. γj’s can be interpreted as the probability that an ad will be noticed
when put in slot j and it is assumed that γj > γj+1 for all 1 ≤ j ≤ K and γj = 0 for
j > K. ei can be interpreted as the probability that an ad put by bidder i will be clicked
on if noticed and is referred to as the relevance of bidder i. The payoff/utility of bidder i
when given slot j at a price of p per-click is given by eiγj(vi −p) and they are assumed to
be rational agents trying to maximize their payoffs.
As of now, Google as well as Yahoo! use schemes closely modeled as RBR(rank by
revenue) with GSP(generalized second pricing). The bidders are ranked in the decreasing
order of eibi and the slots are allocated as per these ranks. For simplicity of notation,
assume that the ith bidder is the one allocated slot i according to this ranking rule, then
i is charged an amount equal to
ei+1bi+1
ei per-click. This mechanism has been extensively
studied in recent years [Edelman et al. 2007; Varian 2007; Lahaie 2006; Aggarwal et al.
2006; Lahaie and Pennock 2007]. The solution concept that is widely adopted to study
this auction game is a reﬁnement of Nash equilibrium independently proposed by Varian
[Varian 2007] and Edelman et al [Edelman et al. 2007]. Under this reﬁnement, the bidders
have no incentive to change to another positions even at the current price paid by the
bidders currently at that position. Edelmen et al [Edelman et al. 2007] calls it locally envy-
free equilibria and argue that such an equilibrium arises if agents are raising their bids to
increase the payments of those above them, a practice which is believed to be common in
actual keyword auctions. Varian [Varian 2007] called it symmetric Nash equilibria(SNE)
and provided some empirical evidence that the Google bid data agrees well with the SNE
bid proﬁle. In particular, an SNE bid proﬁle bi’s satisfy
(γi − γi+1)vi+1ei+1 + γi+1ei+2bi+2 ≤ γiei+1bi+1 ≤ (γi − γi+1)viei + γi+1ei+2bi+2
(1)
for all i = 1,2,...,N. Now, recall that in the RBR with GSP mechanism, the bidder i
pays an amount
ei+1bi+1
ei per-click, thereforethe expectedpayment i makes per-impression
2http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20080319/020719583.shtml, http://www.techcrunch.com/2008/03/18/how-
geosign-blew-160-million/
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is γiei
ei+1bi+1
ei = γiei+1bi+1. Thus the best SNE bid proﬁle for advertisers (worst for the
auctioneer) is minimum bid proﬁle possible according to Equation 1 and is given by
γiei+1bi+1 =
K  
j=i
(γj − γj+1)vj+1ej+1 (2)
and therefore, the revenue of the auctioneer at this minimum SNE is
K  
i=1
γiei+1bi+1 =
K  
i=1
K  
j=i
(γj − γj+1)vj+1ej+1 =
K  
j=1
(γj − γj+1)jvj+1ej+1. (3)
For the comparative analysis, in the present work, we assume that the auction used to
sell the original slots (i.e., without any additional capacity), the single combinedauction in
the auctioneer-based-modelrun by the primaryauctioneer to sell the original slots together
with the additional slots created by him, as well as, the two auctions in the mediator-based
model (one run by the primary auctioneer to sell the original slots and the other run by the
mediator to sell the additional slots created by her), are all run via RBR with GSP i.e. the
mechanism currently being used by Google and Yahoo!. The solution concept we use is
SymmetricNash Equilibria(SNE)/locallyenvy-freeequilibria[Edelmanet al. 2007; Varian
2007]. Nevertheless, as evident from the intuition behind the proofs provided later in the
paper, the results hold true for other interesting allocation and pricing mechanisms as well.
2. THE MODEL
We will refer to the scenario where the additional capacity is created by a for-proﬁt media-
tor as MDC (Mediator Driven additional Capacity ) and the scenario where the additional
capacity is created by the auctioneer as ADC (Auctioneer Driven additional Capacity ).
—Additional/Secondary Slots:
—How are the slots created? In MDC, the mediator participates in the original auction
run by the search engine (called p-auction) and competes with advertisers for slots
(called primary slots). Suppose that in the p-auction, the slot assigned to the mediator
is l, then effectively, the additional slots are obtained by forking this primary slot
in to L additional slots, where L ≤ K. By forking we mean the following: on the
associated landing page the mediator puts some information relevant to the speciﬁc
keyword associated with the p-auction along with the space for additional slots. Let
us call these additional slots as secondary slots. In ADC, similarly, the additional
slots are obtained by forking one of the original slots. Here, the auctioneer puts her
ownad/linkinthatslot, andontheassociatedlandingpage,sheputssomeinformation
relevantto the speciﬁc keywordalong with space for additionalslots. We considerthe
single fork case in ADC and single mediator case in MDC for the sake of simplicity
of presentation and so that the calculations do not get unwieldy, but the results can
be extended to the case where the auctioneer forks multiple slots (in ADC) and adds
additional capacity, or there are more than one mediators involved (in MDC).
—Fitness and New position based CTRs: The quality of the additional/secondary slots
is measured by a ﬁtness factor. Let the probability associated with the ad put by the
auctioneer (in ADC) or the mediator (in MDC) for creating additional capacity to be
clicked,if noticed,bedenotedas ˜ f. InMDC,this is actuallythe relevancescoreofthe
mediator in the p-auction. Moreover, the position-based CTRs for the additional slots
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in the landing page will in general be different than on the main page, and it might
actually improve,say by a factor of α. This means that the position based CTR for the
jth additional slot on the associated landing page is modeled as αγj. Therefore, we
can deﬁne a ﬁtness factor f to indicate the effective quality of additional slots being
created, which is equal to ˜ fα. Thus, if the original slot being forked is l, and there are
L additional slots being created on the landing page, then the effective position based
CTRs for the additional slots thus obtained are γlfγ1,γlfγ2,...,γlfγL respectively.
Clearly, fγ1 < 1; however, f itself could be greater than 1.
—A single combined auction vs two uncoupled auctions: The major difference in the
two scenarios MDC and ADC is that in MDC there are two uncoupled auctions- the
one run by the auctioneer to sell the primary slots where the mediator also competes
for a slot (i.e. p-auction), and the other run by the mediator to sell the secondary slots
( called s-auction), however in ADC there is a single auction run by the auctioneer to
sell primary as well as secondary slots. Thus there is no s-auction in ADC. For the
comparative analysis, we assume that the single combined auction in ADC as well as
the two auctions in MDC, are all run via RBR with GSP (i.e. the mechanism currently
being used by Google and Yahoo!) and the solution concept we use is Symmetric Nash
Equilibria(SNE)/locally envy-free equilibria [Edelman et al. 2007; Varian 2007].
—p-auction: InMDC, themediatorparticipatesintheoriginalauctionrunbythesearch
engineandcompetewithadvertisersforaprimaryslot. Fortheithagent(anadvertiser
or a mediator), let v
p
i and b
p
i denote her true valuation and the bid for the p-auction
respectively. Further, let us denote v
p
i e
p
i by s
p
i where e
p
i is the relevance score of ith
agent for p-auction. There are still K slots for this p-auction, and the position based
CTRs are still the same as in the case without additional capacity.
In ADC, in the combined auction there are now ˜ K = K + L − 1 slots and for each
slot there will be a probability of being noticed if an advertiser is assigned to that
slot i.e. its position based CTR. We rename the slots in the decreasing order of their
CTRs. That is, the jth slot is the one having jth maximum of the elements from
the set {γ1,γ2,...,γl−1,γl+1,...,γK}∪{γlfγ1,γlfγ2,...,γlfγL} and its CTR is
denoted by ˜ γj. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that there are no ties i.e. no two
slots have the same position based CTRs. Therefore, like γj’s we have ˜ γj > ˜ γj+1
for all 1 ≤ j ≤ K + L − 1 and ˜ γj = 0 for all j ≥ K + L. Further note that,
˜ γj = γj for j ≤ l − 1, and ˜ γl < γl. Therefore ˜ γj − ˜ γj+1 = γj − γj+1 for j < l − 1,
˜ γl−1 −˜ γl > γl−1 −γl, and ˜ γj −˜ γj+1 could be greater than or less than γj −γj+1 for
l ≤ j ≤ K depending on how the new position based CTRs are distributed among
the old ones.
—s-auction: In ADC, there is no s-auction. In MDC, the mediator runs her individual
sub-auction for selling the secondary slots. For an advertiser there is another type of
valuations and bids, the ones associated with s-auctions. For the ith agent, let vs
i and
bs
i denote her true valuation and the bid for the s-auction respectively. In general, the
two types of valuations or bids corresponding to p-auction and the s-auctions might
differ a lot. We also assume that vs
i = 0 and bs
i = 0 wheneveri is a mediator. Further,
for the advertisers who do not participate in one auction (p-auction or s-auction), the
corresponding true valuation and the bid are assumed to be zero. Also, for notational
convenience let us denote vs
ies
i by ss
i, where es
i is the relevance score of ith agent
for the s-auction. Further, the s-auction is not coupled to the p-auction, meaning
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that the corresponding auctions are independent of each other in the sense that for a
player who participates in both the auction games- the problem of maximizing the
combined payoff from the two auctions is same as the problems of maximizing the
payoffs from the individual auctions independently. This is indeed very reasonable in
practice because the conversionrates (and consequently the valuations) derived at the
two auction sites would be generally different, and further they have the ﬂexibility of
reporting different bid for the two auctions.
—Freedom of participation: In ADC, since the auctioneer runs a single combined auc-
tion to sell original slots together with the additional ones, a bidder is allowed only to
bid for all slots (original slots plus the additional ones) together and not for the two
kind of slots individually. This is unlike in MDC, where the mediator runs her own
sub-auction. Advertisers are free to bid for primary as well as secondary slots, and in
general report two bid values - one to the auctioneer for the p-auction, and the other
to the mediator for the s-auction.
—True valuation of mediator: The true valuation of the mediator (for the p-auction)
is derived from the expected revenue (total payments from advertisers) she obtains
from her corresponding s-auction ex ante. This way of deriving the true valuation
for the mediator is reasonable because, the mediator can participate in the p-auction
several times and run her correspondings-auction and can estimate the revenue she is
deriving from the s-auction.
—Capacity: Thecapacityis deﬁnedas the sumof positionbasedCTRs. Thusthe capacity
in the original model without the additional/secondary slots is
 K
j=1 γj. In ADC or
MDC, it is
 K
i=1,i =l γj +γlf
 L
i=1 γi. Note that for a ﬁxed L,l, the capacity increases
iff f increases, for a ﬁxed l,f, it increases iff L increases.
3. RESULTS
3.1 The MDC Scenario
We ﬁrst discuss the change in the revenue of the auctioneer due to the involvement of the
mediator and our observation as noted in Result 3.1 is that it always increases. Intuitively,
when the mediator participates for buying the primary slots, it increases the competition
in the p-auction and therefore the revenue of the auctioneer goes up. Thus, as long as
the mediator has a good enough ﬁtness that guarantees her a slot in the p-auction, the
auctioneer deﬁnitely gains in terms of revenue. Further, the better the mediator’s valuation
is, the better slot the mediator gets allocated, bringing forth more gain in revenue. Besides
keeping a good ﬁtness factor f, there is another smart way for the mediator to improve her
true valuation. She could actually run many subauctions related to the speciﬁc keyword in
question. This can be doneas follows: besides providingthe additionalslots on the landing
page, the informationsection of the page couldcontainlinks to otherpages whereinfurther
additional slots associated with a related keyword could be provided3.
RESULT 3.1. Increasing the capacity via mediators improves the revenue of the auc-
tioneer.
FortheformalproofofResult3.1,wewill ﬁrst needtodiscusstheincentivepropertiesof
the two uncoupled auctions, the p-auction and the s-auction respectively, and in particular
3For example, the mediator “personalloans.com”.
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the bid proﬁles at their respective SNE’s.
Suppose the allocations for the p-auction and s-auction are σ : {1,2,...,N} −→
{1,2,...,N} and τ : {1,2,...,N} −→ {1,2,...,N} respectively. Then the payoff
of the ith agent from the combined auction (p-auction and s-auction together) is
ui = γσ−1(i)
 
s
p
i − r
p
σ−1(i)+1
 
+ ˜ γτ−1(i)
 
s
s
i − r
s
τ−1(i)+1
 
where r
p
j = b
p
σ(j)e
p
σ(j), rs
j = bs
τ(j)es
τ(j).
From the mathematical structure of payoffs and strategies available to the bidders wherein
two different uncorrelated values can be reported as bids in the two types of auctions in-
dependently of each other (i.e. since the two auctions are uncoupled), it is clear that the
equilibrium of the combined auction game is the one obtained from the equilibria of the
p-auction game and the s-auction game each played in isolation. In particular at minimum
SNE [Edelman et al. 2007; Varian 2007],
γir
p
i+1 =
K  
j=i
(γj − γj+1)s
p
σ(j+1) for all i = 1,2,...,K
and
˜ γirs
i+1 =
L  
j=i
(˜ γj − ˜ γj+1)ss
τ(j+1) for all i = 1,2,...,L
which implies that (recall that the effective position based CTRs for the secondaryslots are
γlfγ1,γlfγ2,...,γlfγL respectively)
γirs
i+1 =
L−1  
j=i
(γj − γj+1)ss
τ(j+1) + γLss
τ(L+1) for all i = 1,2,...,L where
s
p
σ(l) = s
p
M = f
L  
j=1
γjr
s
j+1 = f


L−1  
j=1
(γj − γj+1)js
s
τ(j+1) + γLLs
s
τ(L+1)


is the true valuation of the mediator multiplied by her relevance score as per our deﬁnition,
which is the expected revenue she derives from her s-auction ex ante given a slot in the
p-auction.
ProofofResult 3.1: Therevenueoftheauctioneerwiththe participationofthe mediator
is
R =
K  
j=1
γjr
p
j+1 =
K  
j=1
(γj − γj+1)js
p
σ(j+1)
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and similarly, the revenue of the auctioneer without the participation of the mediator is
R0 =
K  
j=1
(γj − γj+1)js
p
˜ σ(j+1)
(where ˜ σ(j) = σ(j) for j < l and ˜ σ(j) = σ(j + 1) for j ≥ l)
=
l−2  
j=1
(γj − γj+1)js
p
σ(j+1) +
K  
j=l−1
(γj − γj+1)js
p
σ(j+2)
∴ R − R0 =
K  
j=max{1,l−1}
(γj − γj+1)j(s
p
σ(j+1) − s
p
σ(j+2)) ≥ 0
wherein the last inequality follows from the observation that
s
p
σ(i) ≥ s
p
σ(i+1)∀i = 1,2,...,K + 1 at SNE.
Now let us turn our attention to the change in the efﬁciency and as we will note below
in the Result 3.2, the efﬁciency always improves by the participation of the mediator. The
basic intuitions behindan increase in efﬁciencyare that the allocation at SNE is an efﬁcient
one [Edelman et al. 2007; Varian 2007], and that the mediator brings in more value by
accommodating more advertisers with a high collective value. Further, better the ﬁtness
and higher the values of advertisers in the s-auction, better the efﬁciency gain will be.
Furthermore, it is implicit in our analysis that the user experience, measured in terms of
total clickability, also improveswhen the ﬁtness is good4. Thus, we can indeed say that the
social welfare (i.e. the total welfare of all the parties involved) improves. Moreover, even
the payoffsof all the advertiserswill increase if the mediator has a high enoughﬁtness (ref.
APPENDIX).
RESULT 3.2. Increasing the capacity via mediators improves the efﬁciency.
Proof: Let E and E0 denote the efﬁciency with and without the participation of the medi-
ator respectively, then we have
E0 =
K  
j=1
γjs
p
˜ σ(j) =
l−1  
j=1
γjs
p
σ(j) +
K  
j=l
γjs
p
σ(j+1),
E =
l−1  
j=1
γjs
p
σ(j) +
K  
j=l+1
γjs
p
σ(j) + γlf
L  
j=1
γjss
τ(j)
∴ E − E0 = γlf
L  
j=1
γjss
τ(j) −
K  
l
(γj − γj+1)s
p
σ(j+1) = γlf
L  
j=1
γjss
τ(j) − γlr
p
l+1 ≥ 0
wherein the last inequality holds becuase
γlf
 L
j=1 γjss
τ(j) ≥ γlf
 L
j=1 γjrs
j+1 = γls
p
σ(l) ≥ γlr
p
l+1 at SNE .
4Athey and Ellison [2007] is an example of work that takes user experience explicitly into account, although not
in the setting of the present paper.
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3.2 The ADC Scenario
Now, we ask the question- what if the auctioneer wants to provide the additional capacity
herself by essentially acting herself as a mediator and running a single combined auction?
Does the revenue of the auctioneer/efﬁciencyimprove or does it degrade in such a model?
Our observation is that, unlike the mediator-based model, often there is a tradeoff between
the revenue and the capacity, and there is a phase transition from possibly a gain in terms
of revenue to a loss as the ﬁtness increases, meaning that there is a critical ﬁtness value be-
yond which the auctioneer always loses in revenue. However, there exist scenarios where
the revenue of the auctioneer could indeed increase by increasing capacity. The following
results formalize some worst case scenarios. Some further discussion is provided in AP-
PENDIX.
Remark: Since there is no s-auction in the ADC scenario, for notational simplicity,
henceforth we will drop the superscripts p. We also assume that the ith bidder is the one
allocated slot i when ranked in the decreasing order of eibi.
RESULT 3.3. Let si’s satisfy (j − 1)sj ≥ jsj+1 for all j ≥ 2. Recall that l is the
primary slot being forked in to additional slots.
(1) For l = 1, if γj’s satisfy (γ1 − γ2) ≥ (γj − γj+1) for all 1 ≤ j ≤ K then there exists
no ﬁtness factor f such that the revenue of auctioneer increases5.
(2) For any l ≥ 2, the gain in the revenue of the auctioneer is a decreasing function of f
and L.
Proof of Result 3.3(1): Let R and R0 denote the revenue of the auctioneer with and
without the additional capacity respectively. Let us deﬁne
i0 = max
1≤i≤K
{i : γ1fγ1 < γi}
then ˜ γj = γj+1 for all 1 ≤ j ≤ i0 − 1, ˜ γi0 = γ1fγ1, and ˜ γj ≥ γj for all j ≥ i0 + 1.
Clearly, i0 ≥ 1. Now,
R0 =
K  
j=1
(γj − γj+1)jsj+1 = γ1s2 −
K  
j=2
γj [(j − 1)sj − jsj+1]
R = ˜ γ1s2 −
K+L−1  
j=2
˜ γj [(j − 1)sj − jsj+1]
∴ R − R0 = (˜ γ1 − γ1)s2 −
K  
j=2
(˜ γj − γj)[(j − 1)sj − jsj+1]
−
K+L−1  
j=K+1
˜ γj [(j − 1)sj − jsj+1].
5Note that the conditions on γj’s hold when they are geometrically decreasing ( i.e. when γj = rj−1,1 ≤ j ≤
K for some r < 1 and 0 otherwise), which is a very good approximation in practice [Abrams and Ghosh 2007;
Feng et al. 2006].
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Therefore, when i0 ≥ 2, we have
R − R0 = −(γ1 − γ2)s2 +
i0−1  
j=2
(γj − γj+1)[(j − 1)sj − jsj+1]
+(γi0 − γ1fγ1)[(i0 − 1)si0 − i0si0+1]
−
K  
j=i0+1
(˜ γj − γj)[(j − 1)sj − jsj+1] −
K+L−1  
j=K+1
˜ γj [(j − 1)sj − jsj+1]
≤ −(γ1 − γ2)s2 + (γ1 − γ2)[s2 − i0si0+1]
(recall that (γ1 − γ2) ≥ (γj − γj+1) and (j − 1)sj − jsj+1 ≥ 0 ∀ j ≥ 2 )
= −(γ1 − γ2)i0si0+1 < 0.
When i0 = 1, we have
R − R0 = −(γ1 − γ1fγ1)s2 −
K  
j=2
(˜ γj − γj)[(j − 1)sj − jsj+1]
−
K+L−1  
j=K+1
˜ γj [(j − 1)sj − jsj+1]
< 0.
Proof of Result 3.3(2): Let
i0 = max
1≤i≤K
{i : γlfγ1 < γi}
then ˜ γj = γj for all 1 ≤ j ≤ l − 1 , ˜ γj = γj+1 for all l ≤ j ≤ i0 − 1, ˜ γi0 = γlfγ1, and
˜ γj ≥ γj for all j ≥ i0 + 1. Clearly, i0 ≥ l ≥ 2.
∴ R = ˜ γ1s2 −
K+L−1  
j=2
˜ γj [(j − 1)sj − jsj+1]
= γ1s2 −
l−1  
j=2
γj [(j − 1)sj − jsj+1] −
i0−1  
j=l
γj+1 [(j − 1)sj − jsj+1]
−γlfγ1 [(i0 − 1)si0 − i0si0+1] −
K+L−1  
j=i0+1
˜ γj [(j − 1)sj − jsj+1]
Now let us increase f to f
′
and denote the new position based CTRs as ˜ γj
′
’s and the new
revenue of the auctioneer as R
′
then two cases arise - one where i0 does not change and
other where it changes to i0 − 1.
Case 1: when i0 does not change by increasing f to f
′
. Clearly, ˜ γj
′
≥ ˜ γj for all
j ≥ i0 + 1 as we will be choosing elements from a set with larger values. Also recall that
si’s satisfy (j − 1)sj − jsj+1 ≥ 0 for all j ≥ 2. Therefore, the second last term in the
expression of R strictly decrease and the last term also decreases and we get R
′
< R.
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Case 2: When i0 changes to i0 − 1 by increasing f to f
′
. In this case, ˜ γ
′
j = γj for all
1 ≤ j ≤ l − 1 , ˜ γ
′
j = γj+1 for all l ≤ j ≤ i0 − 2, ˜ γ
′
i0−1 = γlf
′
γ1, and ˜ γ
′
j ≥ ˜ γj for all
j ≥ i0. Therefore,
R
′
− R = γi0 [(i0 − 2)si0−1 − (i0 − 1)si0] − γlf
′
γ1 [(i0 − 2)si0−1 − (i0 − 1)si0]
−
K+L−1  
j=i0
(˜ γ
′
j − ˜ γj)[(j − 1)sj − jsj+1]
≤ (γi0 − γlf
′
γ1)[(i0 − 2)si0−1 − (i0 − 1)si0] < 0.
Recall that the bidders are characterized by their true valuations v
p
i ’s and their relevance
scores ei’s and si = eivi. Thus, there is a wide pool of bidders satisfying the conditions
in the above result, and therefore indicating a signiﬁcant tradeoff between revenue of the
auctioneerand the capacity. Intuitively,the conditions (j−1)sj ≥ jsj+1 state that the si’s
are well separated, and therefore the payments that the bidders make at SNE are also well
separated. Increasing capacity (via increasing f or L) means essentially selling a fraction
of the clicks at a lower price. When si’s are well separated, the extra revenue coming from
the newly accommodatedbidders still fall short of that lost due to lower payments fromthe
other bidders. Further, the Result 3.3 suggests that there is a phase transition from possibly
positive gain in the revenue to negative as f increases, and there is a critical f beyond
which the auctioneer always loses.
Now let us look at the change in efﬁciency due to added capacity in ADC. In this case,
the result is more in consonance with MDC, i.e., the efﬁciency increases as ﬁtness in-
creases. However, unlike in MDC, the efﬁciency could indeed decrease by increasing
capacity.
RESULT 3.4. The efﬁciency is an increasing function of ﬁtness f.
Proof: Let E denote the efﬁciency when additional capacity is added. Let us deﬁne
i0 = max
1≤i≤K
{i : γlfγ1 < γi}
then ˜ γj = γj for all 1 ≤ j ≤ l − 1 , ˜ γj = γj+1 for all l ≤ j ≤ i0 − 1, ˜ γi0 = γlfγ1, and
˜ γj ≥ γj for all j ≥ i0 + 1. Clearly, i0 ≥ l. Then,
E =
K+L−1  
j=1
˜ γjsj =
l−1  
j=1
γjsj +
i0−1  
j=l
γj+1sj + γlfγ1si0 +
K+L−1  
j=i0+1
˜ γjsj.
Now let us increase f to f
′
and denote the new position based CTRs as ˜ γj
′
’s and the
new efﬁciency as E
′
then two cases arise - one where i0 does not change and other where
it changes to i0 − 1.
Case 1: when i0 does not change by increasing f to f
′
. Clearly, ˜ γj
′
≥ ˜ γj for all
j ≥ i0 + 1 as we will be choosing elements from a set with larger values. Therefore, the
second last term in the expression of E strictly increase and the last term also increases
and we get E
′
> E.
Case 2: When i0 changes to i0 − 1 by increasing f to f
′
. In this case, ˜ γ
′
j = γj for all
1 ≤ j ≤ l − 1 , ˜ γ
′
j = γj+1 for all l ≤ j ≤ i0 − 2, ˜ γ
′
i0−1 = γlf
′
γ1, and ˜ γ
′
j ≥ ˜ γj for all
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j ≥ i0. Therefore,
E
′
=
l−1  
j=1
γjsj +
i0−2  
j=l
γj+1sj + γlf
′
γ1si0−1 +
K+L−1  
j=i0
˜ γjsj.
≥ E + (γlf
′
γ1 − γi0)si0−1 > E.
4. DISCUSSIONS
Having established some results on how improvingthe capacity via mediator drivenmodel
and auctioneer driven model effect the revenue and efﬁciency, we would now like to com-
pare the two models in terms of these two parameters, which are considered two funda-
mental bench-markingmetrics in mechanism design theory [Krishna 2002].
First, recall that the auctioneer’s revenue always increases in MDC (Result 3.1) and in
fact the revenue of the auctioneer increases as the ﬁtness of the mediator increases, thus
there is no conﬂict between the revenue and the capacity in that scenario. However, as we
saw that in the ADC often there is a tradeoff between the revenue and the capacity (Result
3.3). Therefore, in terms of revenue, MDC is superior to ADC. A typical tradeoff curve is
shown in the Figure 1. Further, recall that the efﬁciency always increases in MDC and in
fact the efﬁciencyincreases as the ﬁtness of the mediatorincreases, thus there is no conﬂict
between the efﬁciency and the capacity in that scenario. However, in ADC, although
the efﬁciency increases when ﬁtness increases, it could go well below the efﬁciency in
the scenario without any additional capacity. A typical tradeoff curve is shown in the
Figure 1. Therefore, even in terms of efﬁciency the MDC is superior to ADC. Hence, we
can conclude that the ADC is indeed inferior to the MDC and the market becomes more
capacity efﬁcient by the participation of mediators.
It is instructive to note that, in the MDC scenario, as long as the p-auction and the s-
auction are not coupled, and the trafﬁc for the s-auction site is drawn from the p-auction
site, it does not matter who adds capacity and runs the s-auction, a mediator or the primary
auctioneer. But in order to add the necessary capacity and run the secondary auctions
effectively, the mediators have to specialize in the particular sector (e.g., loans, ﬁnance,
business logistics etc.) that they are adding capacity to. Thus, if the primary auctioneer
(e.g.,asearchengineportal)wantstoalsoplaytheroleofthemediatorthenit willalsohave
to develop the necessary sales force and business infrastructure. For example, if Google
wanted to take on the role of business.com and personalloans.com (see APPENDIX) then
it will have to develop a support and sales force that will reach out to small-businesses and
to loan companies, which might detract it from its core business. Thus, we expect that
separate mediator entities, specializing in different sectors, will continue to coexist with
the giant search portals, who specialize on being the primary auctioneers and the source
of primary trafﬁc or leads. Our results are further conﬁrmed by a recent empirical study
[Gunawardana et al. 2008].
APPENDIX
A. MDC: ADVERTISERS’ PAYOFFS
Clearly, for the newly accommodatedadvertisers, that is the ones who lost in the p-auction
but win a slot in s-auction, the payoffs increase from zero to a positive number. Now let us
see where do these improvementsin the revenue of the auctioneer (Result 1), in payoffs of
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Fig. 1. Tradeoff curves for Auctioneer’s Revenue/Efﬁciency: MDC vs ADC. The data used is the following:
N = 8,K = 5,L = 3, γ = [0.4 0.25 0.2 0.15 0.10],
sp = [25 20 8 5 3 2 1.5 1], ss = [0 0 10 4 3 6 0 0].
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newly accommodated advertisers, and in the efﬁciency (Result 2) come from? Only thing
left to look at is the change in the payoffs for the advertisers who originally won in the
p-auction, that is the winners when there was no mediator. The new payoff for jth ranked
advertiser in p-auction is
uσ(j) = γjs
p
σ(j) −
K  
i=j
(γi − γi+1)s
p
σ(i+1) + us
σ(j)
where
u
s
σ(j) = γlfγτ−1(σ(j))
 
s
s
σ(j) − r
s
τ−1(σ(j))+1
 
is herpayofffromthe s-auction. Also, forj ≤ l−1,herpayoffwhentherewas nomediator
is
u0
σ(j) = γjs
p
σ(j) −
K  
i=j
(γi − γi+1)s
p
˜ σ(i+1)
= γjs
p
σ(j) −
l−2  
i=j
(γi − γi+1)s
p
σ(i+1) −
K  
i=l−1
(γi − γi+1)s
p
σ(i+2).
∴ uσ(j) − u0
σ(j) = us
σ(j) −
K  
i=l−1
(γi − γi+1)(s
p
σ(i+1) − s
p
σ(i+2))
Similarly, for j ≥ l + 1, her payoff when there was no mediator is
u0
σ(j) = γj−1s
p
σ(j) −
K  
i=j−1
(γi − γi+1)s
p
σ(i+2)
∴ uσ(j) − u
0
σ(j) = u
s
σ(j) −
K  
i=j−1
(γi − γi+1)(s
p
σ(i+1) − s
p
σ(i+2))
Therefore, in general we have,
uσ(j) − u0
σ(j) = us
σ(j) −
K  
i=max{l−1,j−1}
(γi − γi+1)(s
p
σ(i+1) − s
p
σ(i+2)).
Thus, for the jth ranked winning advertiser from the auction without mediation, the
revenue from the p-auction decreases by
 K
i=max{l−1,j−1}(γi −γi+1)(s
p
σ(i+1) −s
p
σ(i+2))
andshe facesaloss unlesscompensatedforbyherpayoffsins-auction. Further,thispayoff
loss will be visible only to the advertiserswho joinedthe auction game beforethe mediator
and they are likely to participate in the s-auction so as to make up for this loss. Thus, via
the mediator, a part of the payoffs of the originally winning advertisers essentially gets
distributed among the newly accommodated advertisers. However, when the mediator’s
ﬁtness factor f is very good, it might be a win-win situation for everyone. Depending on
how good the ﬁtness factor f is, sometimes the payofffrom the s-auction might be enough
to compensate for any loss by accommodatingnew advertisers. Let us consider an extreme
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situation when L = K and τ = ˜ σ. The gain in payoff for the advertiser σ(j) is
γlf
K  
i=j
(γi − γi+1)(s
s
σ(j) − s
s
σ(i+1)) −
K  
i=max{l−1,j−1}
(γi − γi+1)(s
p
σ(i+1) − s
p
σ(i+2))
Therefore as long as
f ≥
 K
i=max{l−1,j−1}(γi − γi+1)(s
p
σ(i+1) − s
p
σ(i+2))
γl
 K
i=j(γi − γi+1)(ss
σ(j) − ss
σ(i+1))
the advertiser σ(j) faces no net loss in payoff and might actually gain.
B. MDC: EXAMPLES OF FOR-PROFIT MEDIATORS
Please refer to the Figures 2, 3, 4, 5.
C. ADC
Remark: Since there is no s-auction in the ADC scenario, for notational simplicity,
henceforth we will drop the superscripts p. We also assume that the ith bidder is the
one allocated slot i when ranked in the decreasing order of eibi.
Value of capacity:
Deﬁnition C.1. LetR0 betheoriginalrevenueoftheauctioneerwithoutaddedcapacity
and R be the new revenue of the auctioneer after adding capacity at their corresponding
minimum SNE [Edelman et al. 2007; Varian 2007], then the “value of capacity” is deﬁned
as R−R0
R0 i.e. the relative gain in the revenue of auctioneer per impression.
OBSERVATION C.2. For a given L, if ∃l ≤ K such that
η > 1 −
 
(γl − ˜ γl)(l − 1)sl +
 K+L−1
j=K+1 (˜ γj − ˜ γj+1)jsj+1
 K
j=l(γj − γj+1)jsj+1
 
where
η = min
K≥j≥l
˜ γj − ˜ γj+1
γj − γj+1
,
then the value of capacity is positive, i.e., revenue of the auctioneer increases by adding
capacity.
PROOF. Let η = minl≤j≤K
˜ γj−˜ γj+1
γj−γj+1 then we have ˜ γj − ˜ γj+1 ≥ η(γj − γj+1) for
l ≤ j ≤ K. At their corresponding minimum SNE [Edelman et al. 2007; Varian 2007],
the original revenue of the auctioneer without added capacity and the new revenue of the
auctioneer after adding capacity are R0 =
 K
j=1(γj − γj+1)jsj+1 and R =
  ˜ K
j=1(˜ γj −
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Fig. 2. For-Proﬁt Mediator: Shaded links are the ads (the primary slots), and the doubly shaded link is the ad of
the mediator personalloans.com
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Fig. 3. Secondary slots at personalloans.com
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Fig. 4. For-Proﬁt Mediator: business.com
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Fig. 5. Secondary slots at business.com
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˜ γj+1)jsj+1 respectively.
∴ R − R0
=
K  
j=1
[(˜ γj − ˜ γj+1) − (γj − γj+1)]jsj+1 +
˜ K  
j=K+1
(˜ γj − ˜ γj+1)jsj+1
=
K  
j=l−1
[(˜ γj − ˜ γj+1) − (γj − γj+1)]jsj+1 +
˜ K  
j=K+1
( ˜ γj − ˜ γj+1))jsj+1
≥ (γl − ˜ γl)(l − 1)sl +
K  
j=l
(η − 1)(γj − γj+1)jsj+1 +
˜ K  
j=K+1
(˜ γj − ˜ γj+1)jsj+1
= (γl − ˜ γl)(l − 1)sl +
˜ K  
j=K+1
(˜ γj − ˜ γj+1)jsj+1 − (1 − η)
K  
j=l
(γj − γj+1)jsj+1
and hence follows the observation.
We now provide an example to conﬁrm that the above observation does not give a vac-
uous sufﬁcient condition and the value of capacity can indeed be positive.
Example C.3. Let l = K and geometrically decreasing γj’s [Abrams and Ghosh 2007;
Feng et al. 2006] i.e. γj = rj−1,1 ≤ j ≤ K for some r < 1 and 0 otherwise. Then
˜ γj = rj−1 for 1 ≤ j ≤ K − 1 and ˜ γj = frj−1 for K ≤ j ≤ K + L − 1 and 0 otherwise.
Also, let jsj+1 ≥ (j − 1)sj for all K + 1 ≤ j ≤ K + L − 1 and (K − 1)sK > KsK+1.
Then, the condition for Observation C.2 is satisﬁed. Detailed calculations are provided
below.
We have
η = min
K≥j≥l
˜ γj − ˜ γj+1
γj − γj+1
=
frK−1(1 − r)
rK−1 = f(1 − r).
Now,
(γl − ˜ γl)(l − 1)sl +
K+L−1  
j=K+1
(˜ γj − ˜ γj+1)jsj+1
≥ (γK − ˜ γK)(K − 1)sK + KsK+1(˜ γK+1 − ˜ γK+L)
= rK−1(1 − f)(K − 1)sK + frKKsK+1.
Also
K  
j=l
(γj − γj+1)jsj+1 = rK−1KsK+1 (as l = K)
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∴ 1 −
 
(γl − ˜ γl)(l − 1)sl +
 K+L−1
j=K+1 (˜ γj − ˜ γj+1)jsj+1
 K
j=l(γj − γj+1)jsj+1
 
≤ 1 −
rK−1(1 − f)(K − 1)sK + frKKsK+1
rK−1KsK+1
= 1 −
 
(K − 1)sK
KsK+1
(1 − f) + fr
 
= f − fr + (1 − f) −
(K − 1)sK
KsK+1
(1 − f)
= f(1 − r) + (1 − f)
 
1 −
(K − 1)sK
KsK+1
 
< f(1 − r) = η.
OBSERVATION C.4. For a given L, if ∃l ≤ K such that
β > 1 −
 K+L−1
j=K+1 ˜ γjsj
 K
j=l γjsj
where β = min
K≥j≥l
˜ γj
γj
, (4)
then the efﬁciency improves.
Proof: We have
E0 =
K  
j=1
γjsj, E =
K+L−1  
j=1
˜ γjsj =
l−1  
j=1
γjsj +
K+L−1  
j=l
˜ γjsj.
∴ E − E0 =
K  
j=l
(˜ γj − γj)sj +
K+L−1  
j=K+1
˜ γjsj.
Let
β = min
K≥j≥l
˜ γj
γj
then
E − E0 ≥
K+L−1  
j=K+1
˜ γjsj − (1 − β)
K  
j=l
γjsj.
and hence follows the observation.
We now provide an example to conﬁrm that the above observation does not give a vac-
uous sufﬁcient condition and the efﬁciency can indeed improve.
Example C.5. Let l = K and geometrically decreasing γj’s as in Example C.3 and let
si’s satisfy sK+j = αjsK for some α < 1. Then, the condition for Observation C.4 is
satisﬁed when f >
 
1−αr
1−αLrL
 
. Detailed calculations are provided below.
β =
˜ γK
γK
=
frK−1
rK−1 = f.
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Also,
K+L−1  
j=K+1
˜ γjsj =
K+L−1  
j=K+1
frj−1sj
= frKsK
L−1  
j=1
rj−1αj = αfrKsK
 
1 − rL−1αL−1
1 − rα
 
∴ 1 −
 K+L−1
j=K+1 ˜ γjsj
 K
j=l γjsj
= 1 −
αfrKsK
 
1−r
L−1α
L−1
1−rα
 
rK−1sK
= 1 − αfr
 
1 − rL−1αL−1
1 − rα
 
=
1 − rα − αrf + frLαL
1 − rα
=
f(1 − rα) + 1 − f − αr + frLαL
1 − rα
= f +
 
1 − f
1 − rLαL
1 − αr
 
< f if f >
1 − αr
1 − rLαL.
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